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INTRODUCTION 
Economic relations between EU member states and Russia have been strengthening steadily since 
2000, especially after the EU eastward enlargement. The  importance of Russia as an export market 
means that disruptions caused by sanctions are not only potentially costly but also contentious. Effects 
upon individual EU states vary due to the extent of trade with Russia and other important indicators of 
interdependence (such as energy sector integration). This paper focuses on the three ‘small’ Visegrad 
states’ – the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia – which have all been at the forefront of the EU 
export boom to Russia.  They have also been amongst those EU countries that have expressed strong 
reservations about the use of economic sanctions against Russia and the leaders of Hungary and 
Slovakia have been amongst the most vocal critics of this aspect of the EU and US response to 
Russia’s actions in Ukraine. In August 2015, a day after Slovak Premier Robert Fico had stated that 
‘meaningless’ EU sanctions were damaging economic growth in the EU, Hungarian Prime Minister 
Viktor Orban said that the West’s sanctions policy “causes more harm to us than to Russia…in 
politics, this is called shooting oneself in the foot” (Szakacs, 2014).  The Russian government 
apparently regards Hungary as one of its main allies in the struggle to avoid renewal of EU sanctions 
in March 2015. In December 2014 it was reported that Moscow had “begun lobbying what it sees as 
sympathetic EU capitals – Budapest, Nicosia, and Rome – to veto next year’s renewal of Russia 
sanctions” (Rettman, 2014).On February 17 this year Orban hosted Vladimir Putin in defiance of the 
EU ban on bilateral summits with the Russian President. Meanwhile a few days earlier  Czech 
President Milos Zeman, who has tended to take Russia’s side throughout the Ukraine crisis, called for 
the lifting or easing of sanctions against Russia following the ‘Minsk 2’ peace deal. Though a division 
between views of President and views of government in the Czech Republic is often claimed, on 
January 15 this year Czech minister of industry and trade Jan Mládek stated that “(o)ur  primary goal 
is to maintain exports to Russia. Diversification of exports is desirable, but we must do it with a 
humble mind, knowing that it is a long and costly affair. Therefore, it is important for us to keep on 
staying on the Russian market” (Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, 2015). 
The official attitudes of certain new member states to the EU’s sanctions strategy towards Russia have 
been interpreted not only in terms of economic and business rationale but also in terms of ‘excessively 
close’ political relations with Russia or even, in the case of Hungary especially, the “attractiveness of 
the ‘successful’ Russian model as regards its authoritarian style that makes the stabilisation of the 
power of the same interest groups possible for long” (Novak, 2014, 16). This paper aims to contribute 
to a more detailed understanding of the determinants of EU states’ attitudes towards sanctions against 
Russia by looking at the longer term evolution of Czech, Hungarian and Slovak bilateral relations 
with Russia – with emphasis on the trade and economy sphere – since EU accession. The current, 
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hesitant, approaches to sanctions on Russia might in fact be seen as a rather natural and predictable 
outcome. More intense trade and economic cooperation with Russia has, for all three countries, 
actually been a key feature of the post-accession period. Furthermore, the record of certain political 
parties in terms of attitudes towards close economic relations with Russia also shows that there is 
nothing surprising about some of the rather mild reactions to Russia’s role in the Ukraine crisis and 
willingness to carry on ‘business-as-usual’ in economic relations in all three countries or even 
prioritise economic interest. This may reflect longer standing pro-Russia positions within ceratin 
sections of the political elites and increasing pragmatism across the political spectrum rather than a 
drift towards a model of democracy that emulates the Russian Federation.   
The first section of the paper contains some very brief analysis of economic relations between Russia 
and the three between 1993 and 2003, during what was essentially a long period of transition. The  
second and substantive part of the paper focuses on the post-2004 period and discusses the ingredients 
of the more intensive relationships with Russia that have developed over the last ten years or so and 
which form the backdrop to current attitudes towards Russia and approaches to sanctions policy.  
These elements of the more intensive commercial relationship with Russia include:  trade growth, 
energy dependence, bilateral relations and the role of intergovernmental commissions, new ‘strategic’ 
visions after the Eurozone crisis, the significance of longstanding alternative perspectives on 
economic and business relations on Russia. The paper will conclude with some very preliminary 
analysis of the impact of the Ukraine crisis on the three countries’ trade relations with Russia. .  
 
 
1. ECONOMIC AND TRADE RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA DURING EU PRE-ACCESSION:   
THE ‘LONG’ PERIOD OF TRANSITION.  
 
The end of communism precipitated a huge adjustment in the external trade of all the ex-CMEA 
countries that entailed a dramatic reduction of their mutual trade, especially with the USSR. Total 
Soviet imports (from all sources) declined by 44 per cent in the first nine months of  1991 as 
compared with the same period in the previous year” (Köves, 1992, 72-3). The CEE states learnt from 
this damaging forced retreat from the increasingly chaotic and unpredictable Soviet market that a 
strategic trade reorientation was not only politically justified but a practical economic necessity as 
well.  After 1991 direct economic relations with Russia became a reality and official date shows that 
trade with Russia settled down into the same broad pattern for all three countries and remained more 
or less stable over the 1993-2003 period. With Russia having inherited the Soviet role of monopoly 
supplier of gas and oil, imports were largely consisting of fossil fuels, delivered via the pipeline 
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infrastructures constructed during the CMEA era.
2
 Energy trade was the core determinant of structural 
trade deficits with Russia. Another key similarity was the inability to correct this imbalance with 
export growth. With some modest fluctuations along the way, the $ values of Czech and Slovak 
exports to Russia were the same in 2003 as 1993 meaning a substantial fall in real terms. Hungary’s 
situation was even less favourable, with a huge fall in the nominal value of exports to Russia with the 
2003 $ value only 58% of the 1992 total. Steadily increasing import bills meant that all three 
countries’ deficits grew strongly, with a 255% increase in the case of the Czech Republic, 218% for 
Slovakia (1993-2003), and 408% for Hungary between 1992 and 2003. Table 1 contains data on the 
three’s trade with Russia between 1992 and 2003. As noted below, however, the official data 
undoubtedly understates the real level of exports to the three towards the end of this period and 
notable growth most likely began after 2000. Nevertheless stagnation characterised the main part of 
the 1993-2003 phase. 
Numerous factors, well documented at the time, accounted for these post-CMEA trade patterns 
between Russia and the three. A considerable portion of CEE exports to the USSR – so-called ‘soft 
goods’ were clearly not viable after 1990. General chaos and weak demand in the Soviet and 
subsequently in the Russian market, coupled with Russia’s own strategic westward orientation during 
the Yeltsin period were also important. As Novak (2014, 11) remarked “(e)xports from Central 
Europe were hit badly by the collapse of domestic purchasing power and the economic crisis in 
Russia. The growing competition with western firms on the Russian market was an additional 
hindrance for firms of the region”. As Table 2 illustrates the three also, of course, experienced a 
decisive strategic reorientation of trade to the West, encouraged by Europe Agreements and a rapid 
move to free trade with the EU. They also took steps to revive their own mutual trade in the 
framework of the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) which was a regional integration 
initiative founded exclusively by and for CEE and, as such, was the closest thing to a revival of sorts 
of the CMEA grouping. The Visegrad Group states agreed to begin mutual trade liberalisation with 
the signing of the Cracow Treaty in December 1992. By the time CEFTA began operation (1 March 
1993) there were four members and accessions of Bulgaria (1997) and Romania (1999) completed the 
ex-CMEA contingent, with Slovenia having entered in 1996. By 1997 the level of intra-CEFTA trade 
was standing  in stark contrast to the Soviet domination of intra-CMEA trade and marginal role of 
trade among the ‘six’: Czech exports to CEFTA were eight times greater than exports to Russia, 
Hungary’s three times greater and Slovakia’s sixteen times greater.  
It is worth mentioning here that despite the differences in official political attitudes to Russia and 
variations in the extent to which there were attempts to cultivate closer economic relations, the results 
                                                          
2
 By the end of the 1990s the Czech Republic had taken advantage of its opportunity to diversification its gas 
supply to some extent, though not enough to make it substantially different from Hungary and Slovakia in terms 
of the basic structure and asymmetry in trade with Russia.  
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in terms of actual levels and patterns of exports to Russia were very similar. In fact there were no real 
perceptible differences in the experiences of each of the countries. The case of Slovakia in the 1994-
1998 period,  where the revival of CMEA-era levels of trade with Russia was the core economic (and 
foreign policy) strategy, was the most notable evidence that stagnation of export trade with Russia 
was not governed by the state of political ties. Novak reinforces this further by referring to the 
opposite (to Slovakia) experience of Poland which “remained the only important player in Russia” 
making it “clear that trade and economic relations could be improved without having good political 
relations” (Novak, 2014, 11).        
 
2. THE CZECH REPUBLIC, HUNGARY AND SLOVAKIA AND RUSSIA SINCE EU 
ACCESSION: MORE INTENSIVE AND LONGER TERM RELATIONSHIPS 
 
1. Trade with Russia after EU Accession – New Trends 
As noted above, during the ‘transition’ period the official data on exports of the three to Russia 
showed that they lacked dynamism, either stagnating or shrinking. By contrast, since EU accession 
the data on exports to Russia has shown very strong growth. Between 2004 and 2013 Czech exports 
had increased by 581%, Hungarian by 344% and Slovak by 906% (Table 3). In 2012 Czech exports to 
Russia accounted for 20.4% of total extra-EU exports, compared to 10.8% in 2004. For Hungary it 
was 13.1% in 2012 compared to 9.8% in 2004 and for Slovakia 25.6% and 9.1% respectively (Table  
4). Despite these increases the trade deficit with Russia widened for both Slovakia and Hungary due 
to higher values of imports from Russia over this period, mainly caused by increased energy prices. 
Nevertheless, as exports grew faster than imports the deterioration in trade balance was moderated. 
Czech export growth easily outpaced that of imports and, thanks to diversification of energy supplies, 
the trade deficit narrowed over this period.    
In terms of the commodity structure of trade, Czech exports to Russia are in a wide range of 
manufactured industrial goods and mainly machinery and transport equipment (especially cars), 
chemicals, food products and construction materials. Slovakia’s main export lines to Russia are 
machinery and transport equipment (especially cars), chemical and allied products, other industrial 
goods and fabrics. Hungary’s most important exports to Russia are in machinery and transport 
equipment, mobile phones, pharmaceuticals, chemical and allied products and foodstuffs. As for 
imports from Russia, in all three countries these are dominated by raw materials and oil and gas, 
which account for around 85%, 90%, and 90% of the imports of the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary respectively.  
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An obvious question concerns the influence of actual EU membership on trade with Russia and the 
extent to which factors connected to EU entry explain the surge in growth of exports to Russia which 
became apparent after 2003.  It seems that there is no strong evidence that EU entry per se was the 
key cause of the observed trade growth although there was a significant statistical impact which in 
fact further emphasises that the important influences had already occurred by the time EU accession 
took place: “(b)efore EU accession exports of TNCs from Central European subsidiaries were mostly 
counted in EU export as a result of firm level agreements between subsidiaries and their headquarters 
in the EU. After accession to the EU, this practice changed, and these exports were counted into the 
export of Central European countries. This statistical change also explains the sudden and radical 
modification of export structures in favour of manufacturing industries, since most of the FDI firms 
exporting to Russia were operating in this category” (Novak, 2014, 11). This underscores certain 
economic consequences of EU entry that have played a major role however in terms of the economic 
development and changing capacities experienced by the three. The large inflows of foreign direct 
investment have built up export capacity, including in the sectors that have been of special  
importance in overall EU exports to Russia and which have experienced rapid growth in recent years. 
They have included  passenger cars /road vehicles and medicinal and pharmaceutical products which 
accounted for 11% and 7% respectively of total EU exports to Russia in 2010 (Eurostat, 2011). As 
Hungarian academician Zsuzsa Ludvig told the Hungarian newspaper Nepszabadsag: “Our 2004 EU 
accession benefited relations. This probably explains why there have been structural changes in our 
exports: the leading role has been assumed by multinational companies with Hungarian interests, and 
they strike their deals with their Russian partners directly, practically without the intervention of the 
Hungarian state” (Wikileaks, 2012).  The changing capacity of the three enabled them to ultimately 
join many other EU states in benefiting from the ‘boom’ in Russian imports that took off after 2000. 
This in turn was on the back of high levels of economic growth and the Russian state’s use of buoyant 
oil revenues to significantly raise household incomes (particularly in Moscow and St Petersburg) and 
fuel consumer spending. Between 2005 and 2010 the value of Russia’s imports more than doubled 
from US$ 79,712 million to US$ 197,472 million, having reached a pre-crisis peak of US$ 230494 
million in 2008.
3
 As well as the three, most EU states experienced strong growth in their exports to 
Russia, demonstrating that the growth of the three’s exports was mainly part of a wider trend. Other 
ex-CMEA states followed this trend also with Poland’s exports growing by 211 per cent between 
2004 and 2010, those of Romania by 528 per cent and Bulgaria by 224 per cent. 
 
2. Entry and Energy Dependence 
                                                          
3
 Data on Russian growth, consumer spending and imports from the Federal State Statistics Service of the 
Russian Federation   
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Russia inherited the USSR’s role  as the main supplier of oil and gas. Energy supply and security has 
remained a major aspect of current Czech, Hungarian and Slovak economic and political relations 
with Russia throughout the post-CMEA/post-USSR era. Deep integration of the energy sector had 
been among the few notable successes of socialist economic integration and not so easy to undo as 
other communist-era linkages. The physical infrastructure for oil and gas supply and transit is still 
very much operational and vital today as Russia remains the principal supplier of oil and natural gas. 
Russia maintained the Soviet reputation as reliable supplier after the end of the CMEA. There were no 
supply disruptions during the EU pre-accession period, even during testy phases in political relations 
and perceived instability in Russia. Slovakia and Hungary kept their traditional levels of dependency 
on Russian supplies and further integration, while the Czech Republic did follow a diversification 
policy, its advantageous geographical location easing the logistical task of building up other supply 
sources and by 2001 its dependence on Russian oil and gas had dropped by around 25% and 30% 
respectively (Votápek, 2003, 98).   
As far as energy security/dependency issues since EU entry are concerned, gas supplies have tended 
to have the highest profile. Reliance on Russian natural gas is high in all three cases but does vary. In 
2012, Russia provided 80 per cent of Hungary’s total gas imports and for Slovakia and the Czech 
Republic the amounts were 83.5% and 57.5% respectively. Hungary and Slovakia are supplied 
primarily by pipelines coming through Ukraine from Russia. Around 30 per cent of Czech gas imports 
come from Norway via the Olbernhauborder transfer station
4
 Supply contracts are negotiated by the 
main gas transmission system operators in each country - RWE Transgas Net in the Czech Republic, 
FGSZ Ltd in Hungary and Slovensky Plynarensky Priemysel, a.s in Slovakia – all of which work on 
the basis of long term deals with Gazprom Export. Gas supply became an increasingly ‘hot topic’ 
after Russia’s disputes with Ukraine disrupted supplies, first in 2007 and again in 2009. The 2009 
crisis, which occurred at the coldest time of year and caused public anxiety about energy security to 
increase considerably, shifted diversification of gas supply to the forefront of the energy policy 
agenda (see Nosko and Lang 2010). Shortly after the 2009 crisis the Czech Republic and Slovakia 
both declared their official support for the Nabucco gas pipeline project backed by the EU (see 
Topolanek 2009 and Duleba 2009).  Hungary of course was already an established proponent of 
Nabucco but also supported the (now cancelled) Russia-led South Stream pipeline with former Prime 
Minister Gyurcsány having stated in 2009 that ‘Hungary is interested in having as many pipelines as 
possible’ (Euractive 2009). The 2014 Ukraine crisis has of course unleashed massive new momentum 
for energy diversification, especially gas supplies. However, for some countries at least, this reflected 
fears of instability of supplies coming through Ukraine rather than supplies from Russia per se. 
Hungary, along with Bulgaria and Serbia, had  invested “substantial financial and political capital” 
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 Source: Eurogas, Energy Delta Institute (EDI) database available at: 
http://www.energydelta.org/mainmenu/edi-intelligence-2/our-services/Country-gas-profiles 
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invested in the South Stream gas pipeline  project and “reacted with shock and anger” when Russia 
announced that the project was being scrapped on 1 December 2014 (Financial Times, 3/12/14, 6).  
Nuclear electricity generation is also an extremely important, albeit up until now lower profile, aspect 
of enduring energy relations with Russia. Nuclear power is a significant part of the energy mix in all 
three countries, accounting for 33% of domestic electricity supply in the Czech Republic and Hungary 
and over half  (55%) in Slovakia. This comes from six reactors in the Czech Republic and four each in 
Hungary and Slovakia (Nuclear Energy Agency, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). All the reactors are Soviet-
era, commissioned and constructed by Soviet partners and these days the Russian nuclear energy giant 
Rosatom is a key partner. Rosatom subsidiary TVEL is the exclusive supplier of nuclear fuel for the 
Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia. Russia has also in past received spent fuel for processing on 
its territory. Rosatom also plays a key role in the supply of spare parts for reactors and maintenance 
schedules and has also been involved in certain crisis operations.
5
 As with pipeline systems, changes 
to this part of the energy infrastructure cannot be made except in the longer term and would be very 
expensive.  
Prior to the Ukraine crisis the main developments were if anything around expanding Russian 
involvement  in projects to modernise and expand nuclear power capability in all three countries. In 
2009 Russia and Slovakia signed a long term deal in nuclear power engineering that involved, 
amongst other things, Slovakia’s “support for the participation of Russian companies in modernizing 
Slovakia's reactors”.6  Most recently, Rosatom has been involved in the project to build new reactors 
at the Jaslovske Bohunice nuclear power complex (Pictures.Dot.News, 2014). Hungary’s commitment 
to the nuclear energy partnership with Russia has also strengthened.  In January 2014 it was 
announced that the Hungarian and Russian governments had agreed that Russia will loan Hungary 
Euro 10 billion to finance construction of two new reactors at Hungary’s Paks nuclear energy plant. 
Following Moscow’s ‘bailout’ loan agreements with Ukraine (Euro 15 billion in November 2013) and 
Belarus (Euro 15 billion in December 2013), the loan to Hungary was described as “the latest in a 
series of Russian moves to use its energy and financial clout to restore influence in eastern Europe” 
(Financial Times, 15/1/14). Some negative consequences of the Ukraine crisis have been apparent in 
the Czech Republic to some extent, at least as far as Russian involvement in the building of new 
nuclear generating capacity. The Rosatom subsidiary Atomstroyexport was in one of the consortia 
bidding to build two new reactors at the Temelin plant in the Czech Republic until the tender was 
cancelled in April 2014. Though the tender cancellation was for different reasons, in early March 
                                                          
5 In Hungary, for example, following a serious incident in April 2003 in which water contamination from the 
fuel rod cleaning system occurred, specialists from TVEL carried out the decontamination work with their 
Hungarian counterparts. 
6
 See ‘Russia, Slovakia sign long-term nuclear power deal’. Available at 
www.http://en.rian.ru/russia/20091117/156872704.html 
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2014 it had, however, already been looking as though Rosatom’s chances of winning this contract 
were a casualty of the Ukrainian crisis and Russia’s occupation of Crimea in particular. On March 3 
2014 Radio Prague reported that Czech Defence Minister Martin Stropnický said that he found it 
“difficult to imagine that Russian firms would complete new units at the Czech Republic’s Temelín 
nuclear power plant in light of Russia’s military intervention in Ukraine”, while “(f)ellow minister in 
government Jiří Dienstbier expressed a similar view, saying that while it was only his personal 
opinion, he could not imagine Russian companies taking part in the tender, stressing that a country 
that resorted to military aggression represented a security risk” (Radio Prague, 2014).  It remains to be 
seen how the fear of significant Russian presence within strategic sectors will affect the future 
developments of nuclear power capacity. Yet future Russian involvement in the nuclear energy sector, 
be it as a source of finance for construction or commissioning Rosatom to build new facilities, has to 
be taken in context.  The involvement of Russian companies has strong internal support and for now, 
the nuclear energy partnership is a longstanding important, stable and trouble-free (i.e. has not 
suffered from any equivalent of the gas crises) dimension of bilateral relations with Russia. Indeed, 
when possible Russian involvement (in place of CEZ, the Czech generating company) in the 
Jaslovske Bohunice that construction project was firsr revealed it was reported that this would be very 
convenient for the Slovak government which “sees Russians as reliable and proven partners in this 
area” (Groszkowski, 2013).  
 
 
3. Intergovernmental Cooperation on Trade and Economic Relations 
Bilateral cooperation between Russia and the governments of the three is a further factor in what have 
undoubtedly been burgeoning trade and economic relations more broadly. In 2004 the Czechs and 
Russians established the Czech-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Industrial and 
Scientific Cooperation (C-RICEISC). The Hungarian-Russian Intergovernmental Committee for 
Economic Cooperation (H-RICEC) was established in 2005.  The Slovak-Russian Intergovernmental 
Commission on Cooperation in the Economy, Science and Technology (S-RICCEST) has a longer 
history having been set up in the aftermath of the collapse of the CMEA and then the USSR in an 
attempt to salvage the viable parts of mutual trade and handle various practical aspects of post-
CMEA/post-USSR economic relations with Russia. The S-RICCEST played useful initial roles to do 
with bilateral trade arrangements and negotiations to resolve transferable rouble debts. It gradually 
faded from view, however, and by the time of EU accession seemed to have fulfilled its purpose. 
Duleba (2009) observed that the Slovak Commission “sank into oblivion and became an example of 
the narrowing of the bilateral tools of Slovak foreign policy in relations with East European countries 
10 
 
in the field of foreign trade” and was abolished by the Dzurinda government in 2002. It was revived 
three years later in 2005.  
The Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Intergovernmental Commissions (IGCs) with Russia bring together 
leading politicians, civil servants, regional actors,  industrialists and other business/commerce 
representatives for extended meetings that can cover specific contracts and map out medium and long-
term economic cooperation.
7
 In all three cases the IGC structure is broadly similar. To give the 
Hungarian case as an example, H-RICEC consists of Hungarian and Russian parts headed by co-
chairmen, both of whom are senior government figures. They are State Secretary of the Prime 
Minister’s office (currently Peter Szijjarto) in the case of Hungary and Minister of Agriculture 
(currently Nikolai Fyodorov) for Russia. The chairmen appoint the secretaries of the eight working 
groups that reflect the main areas of cooperation In the H-RICEH case these are: agriculture, 
construction, energy, ICTS and innovation, military technology, medicine and pharmacology, regional 
cooperation and tourism.
8
 Each working group is headed by top ranking officials of the relevant 
Ministries or state agencies and representatives of the business community are also important 
members of the H-RICEC working groups. The Chairmen and working groups are in regular contact 
and meet regularly.  The main annual event is the 2 day plenary meeting attended by not only all the 
state representatives of Hungary and Russia, including Szijjarto and Fyodorov, but also by 
representatives of those Russian and Hungarian companies that are heavily involved in mutual 
economic relations. The plenary sessions rotate alternately in Budapest and Moscow and involve (first 
day) detailed discussions in the working groups and (second day) working groups report on the year’s 
achievements, relevant issues and problems. The H-RICEH Chairmen have the role of leading 
discussions of the working groups in order to find solutions to any acute problems. Another important 
function of the plenary is to finalise and sign the ‘Protocol of the plenary session’ that summaries 
progress in the previous years and contains a jointly agreed action plan for the coming year, covering 
all the working groups.  
The intergovernmental commissions are undoubtedly increasingly seen as valuable instruments to 
actively promote exports to Russia and further develop the business/economic partnership. They now 
appear to be firmly entrusted with the task of promoting trade and various aspects of economic 
cooperation between Russia and each of the three. Though an assessment of the precise impact of 
these bodies is not within the scope of this paper some observations are as follows. First, they 
                                                          
7 The legacy of Czechoslovakia means that there are strong enduring ties between Czech and Slovak companies and business associations 
that also cooperate, both with each other and with their Russian ones, in order to promote their mutual commercial interests in Russia. For 
example a business fair to promote Czech and Slovak companies in Russia was held in October 2009 in Moscow. The list of participants in 
the ‘Days of Czech and Slovak Businesses’ included “Business Council for Cooperation with the Czech Republic, the Business Council for 
Cooperation with Slovakia, the Business Council of entrepreneurs of the Czech Republic for Cooperation with Russia, and the Slovakia-
Russia Business Council. The Russian Chamber of Commerce and Industry was actively involved in the event organization” 
(premier.gov.ru/eng/events/pressconferences/8257) 
8 The S-RICCEST has the following working groups:   For the C-RICEISC they are:  As well as sectoral cooperation and promotion of 
business links, the commissions are currently working with political authorities in regions outside the main centres of Moscow and St. 
Petersburg.8 
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illustrate that contrary to CEE states initial assumptions, EU entry did not in fact mean that all 
competence on economic and trade relations with Russia was now gone (to the Brussels level) and 
many possible avenues for productive bilateral cooperation on trade and economic relations were 
actually still open. Second, official statements seem to affirm that these bilateral bodies are regarded 
positively and can be good vehicles for trade development and other forms of economic cooperation. 
They have been described as bodies “responsible for ‘oiling’ economic ties, and taking strategic 
decisions” (Wikileaks, 2012). The C-RICEISC has been credited with “some success in removing 
trade barriers” (Wikileaks, 2008). They can be regarded also as useful channels for 
intergovernmental communication and dialogue even during times when relations at the political-
diplomatic level may be strained. For example in March 2013, the S-RICCEST plenary included a 
bilateral meeting between the Slovak and Foreign Chairman (Foreign Ministers Lajcak and Lavrov) 
who “exchanged views on further development of relations and cooperation vis-à-vis the European 
agenda as well as views on a range of current key international issues from the wider global context” 
(Slovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2013).  Some examples of positive rhetoric are as follows. The  
meeting of the H-RICEC that took place in Moscow during March 2011 discussed “cooperation 
opportunities in the field of energy, agriculture, finances and transport” and signed a ‘ joint 
declaration of modernisation and partnership’ that “outlines the long-term cooperation opportunities 
for business organisations, and creates a framework for cooperation between the two governments in 
modernisation, research and development”9 At the September 18 2013 meeting in Budapest Russian 
agricultural minister Nikolai Fydorov “stressed that a new impetus should be given to bilateral 
economic relations” (Hungarian Ambience, 2013). The October 2010 Moscow meeting of C-
RICEISC involved two days of bilateral talks and expressed “support for important Czech-Russian 
projects or the utilisation of the possibilities offered by the EU-RF initiative Partnership for 
Modernisation and Cooperation” (Vlček, 2010). In a press statement during his 2009 visit to 
Bratislava Vladimir Putin remarked that the S-RICCEST had an important role in “expanding 
business connections, investment partnerships, and cooperation in high-technology industries”.10  
 
4. New ‘Strategic Visions’ after the Eurozone Crisis? 
The Visegrad 3 are all small economies that are heavily dependent on exports, which account for 80-
85% GDP with significant export capacity having been generated by foreign direct investment.  For 
the bulk of the post-communist period all of the now new member states have had an economic 
strategy that has focused on the EU as the main ‘development centre’ that has simultaneously acted as 
                                                          
9See ‘Hungarian-Russian Negotiations Concluded by Signature of Modernisation Declaration’. Available at: 
http://www.kormany.hu/en/ministry-of-national-development/news/hungarian-russian-negotiations-concluded-by-signature-of-
modernisation-declaration 
10http://www.pchrb.ru/en/press_center/news/index.php/index.php?id4=429 
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the main market for expansion of imports and as the main source of external financing. In the light of 
the Eurozone crisis and stagnating growth in the EU along with the emergence of potential new 
development centres, Novak (2014, 30) raises the question of whether the EU “will remain the 
development centre for the whole region despite the problems with its economic development and the 
widening division between countries?”. Novak suggests that the weaker, export-dependent new 
member states that fall into the category of South in the post-Eurozone crisis notions of North-South 
divide inside the EU are more prone to seeking extra-EU development centre possibilities. 
While not suggesting that the strengthening and expanding economic ties with Russia, particularly 
through additional economic diplomacy and placing more emphasis on the role of the bilateral 
intergovernmental commissions, was connected to a search for a new development centre it certainly 
reflected a strategy of seeking to access new, dynamic export markets. Hungary, however, classed as 
having a direction ‘different’ to the Northern countries of the EU has certainly fixed its attempts to 
cultivate economic links with Russia, and the ‘east’ more broadly  to a wider strategic vision known 
as the  ‘Eastern Winds Doctrine’. This has emphasised dialogue with Asian and former  Soviet states 
to generate new sources of investment and business relationships. Since first aired by Orban in 2009 
and operationalised into a cornerstone of the Orban government’s foreign policy after 2010. It has 
involved high level missions to Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Arabia, 
Thailand, Turkey and many others. There have been  multiple trips to China and Russia (Kalan, 
2014). The Eastern Winds Doctrine also seems to involves avoiding any antagonisms with significant 
Eastern partners such as Russia and Kalan has noted this  tendency as especially visible in Hungary’s 
policy to Ukraine which has involved development of  “trade relations with Russia but political 
dialogue has been limited to the issue of the Hungarian minority in Transcarpathia”. Novak also notes 
that engaging with different potential development centres causes complications because not all 
centres operate ‘according to the same rules’ and contradictions with the rules and regulations of the 
EU are possible. Hungary’s 2014 nuclear deal with Russia/Rosatom, now under serious challenge 
from the European Commission, is a clear illustration.       
 
5. Alternative Political Party Perspectives on Russia  
The main political parties in the three have been prone to different rhetoric on relations with Russia, 
although those differences are not always so apparent when it comes to preferences on economic 
relations,  at least when it comes to the question of selling products to Russia. Centre-left parties tend 
to fall into the Russia-friendly category and are inclined to prioritise economic relations with Russia. 
This is partially due to the significance of CMEA/socialist era networks of government officials, with 
the leaders of left-leaning parties usually ex ‘reform socialists’ who were USSR-educated,  
comfortable in Moscow and able enjoy close and friendly relations with their Russian counterparts. 
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Centre-right parties, with leaderships not from this background, tend to be Russia-cautious or Russia-
hostile and view economic relations with Russia as much threat as opportunity. This categorisation 
was certainly a reliable assumption during the EU pre-accession period. As the post-accession period 
has developed it remains more or less valid as a rule of thumb but the reality has become increasingly 
complex and nuanced as a consequence of the growing importance of Russia as a trade partner. This 
seems to have mainly affected the consistency and stability of the views/rhetoric and actions of the 
centre-right parties. It should also be said that there seems to be a noticeable difference between 
Slovakia on the one hand and the Czech Republic and Hungary on the other. Indeed, Slovakia has 
been labelled “a ‘quasi-Russophile’ country and party variations are somewhat milder in that no major 
party could be classed as anti-Russia. Both major parties, for example, support close economic ties 
with Russia, but the centre left tends to be somewhat more accommodating and supportive of Russia’s 
security and foreign policy concerns. Hence in October 2009 ’Slovak prime minister Fico pinpointed 
that as long as he acts in the capacity of prime minister, the United States will not be allowed to 
deploy the anti-missile system in Slovakia’  (Dangerfield, 2013, 181).  
While the above mentioned party categorisations were fairly reliable in the EU pre-accession period 
the situation has become rather more complex and nuanced since EU membership and Russia’s 
growing importance as a trade partner. This can be illustrated in a number of ways beginning with 
divisions within parties/governments have complicated the picture. For example many statements and 
actions of former Czech President Klaus did not reflect the Russia-cautious attitude of the Civic 
Democratic Party led government of the time.  Indeed, Klaus led various Czech trade and economic 
cooperation delegations to Russia that were organised in the framework of the C-RICEISC. As 
Kratochvil (2010) wrote, Klaus’s “role was prominent especially in 2007, in connection with his visit 
to Moscow accompanied by a delegation of Czech businessmen, and in 2009, when he assumed the 
position of representative of the presidency country at the EU-Russia summit in Khabarovsk”. Milos 
Zeman has carried on this pro-Russia tradition since becoming Czech President and his perspective 
has long been evident. When the Czech Social Democratic Party formed the government in 1998 with 
Zeman as Prime Minister it marked a switch towards a more conciliatory foreign policy approach to 
Russia.   
Second, regardless of parties’ political rhetoric about Russia, it is clear that the growing significance 
of economic relations with Russia has gradually caused pragmatism to increasingly outweigh, or at 
least  not be too compromised by, ideological or values-based foreign policy stances on Russia. In the 
case of the Czech Republic the political tensions of recent years – including the ramifications of the 
proposal to locate part of the US Ballistic Missile Defence system in the Czech Republic and Poland 
and various criticisms of the Russia state (over its democracy and human rights records, actions in 
Georgia etc.) that came from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs -  did not prevent a largely ‘business as 
usual’ approach in the economic and business sphere. An important role in this was played by the 
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Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, whose influence on Czech relations with Russia has grown, as 
Kratochvil (2009, 206) informs us, “in direct proportion with the increasing importance of Czech-
Russian relations. Contrasting with the problematic political relations (especially during 2007 and 
2008) the representatives of the Ministry of Industry and Trade strived to separate the political and 
economic dimension of the mutual relations”. The Czech Ministry of Industry and Trade, of course, 
have responsibility for the C-RICEISC. The case of Hungary over the last few years has been 
particularly spectacular in this respect showing that even parties prone to particularly strong anti-
Russia rhetoric, when they get into power, can rapidly learn the need to be pragmatic about the need 
to avoid jeopardising economic links with Russia. After the election in April 2010, various meetings 
of important bilateral economic cooperation committees were cancelled by the Russian side and 
Orbán ’s first meeting with Putin in November 2010 was unproductive with ’the Kremlin’s mistrust 
and Hungary’s lack of interesting assets’ having had a very negative impact on the talks (Ugrosdy 
2011). In this context, soon after what was the ‘standard’ expression of attitudes as mentioned above, 
the government of Victor Orbán  seemed to rapidly jettison its anti-Russia credentials. Racz (2012) 
noted that the Orbán  government refrained from any criticism of the 2011 Russian parliamentary 
elections, no doubt mindful of the serious effects provocative rhetoric can have on Russia’s 
willingness to do business. The Orbán  administration is certainly not constraining the work of the H-
RICEC – quite the opposite in fact. Also, the current Hungarian enthusiasm for participation in the 
South Stream gas pipeline was somewhat at odds with comments made  by Orbán  in 2008 when he 
accused Gyurcsany of ‘treason’ for signing the agreement on Hungary’s participation. Moreover, as 
noted earlier, the Hungarian government seems to have gone even further with the January 2014 deal 
to accept a Russian loan to finance new reactors and other generating project at the Paks nuclear site. 
These days, critical voices in Hungary even speak of the ‘Putinisation’ of  the Hungarian Prime 
Minister.  
 
Third, while the growth of trade with – and especially exports to – Russia underlies the shift to a more 
pragmatic political engagement with Russia, the situation is more nuanced when it comes to inward 
investments from Russia, especially when it comes to large scale ‘strategic’ investments. In Hungary, 
the right wing Fidesz party’s traditional position has been similar. In November 2010, just after 
winning the election (and just before his ‘conversion’) Orbán  said that “any kind of partnership with 
Russia was dangerous. He complained that more and more EU countries were initiating economic 
cooperation with Russia and that this would lead to a dangerous economic and political penetration of 
Russia into the West” (Hungarian Spectrum, 2013).  Kratochvil (2009, 205) notes that in 2009 
Aeroflot was disqualified from the competition to privatise Czech Airlines, possibly because of 
unpublished ‘security’ threats. This fits with the content of a Wikileaks release of a 2008 document 
that stated that the “ODS-led government, however, is very concerned about Russian investment in 
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the Czech Republic, especially in the energy and media sectors, and regularly intervenes to prevent 
Czech assets from falling into Russian hands”.  
 
Fourth, the revival of the Intergovernmental Commissions after EU accession was, in all three states, 
undertaken by left-leaning governments of the time.
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 Yet  there is no rule that Centre-right parties 
neglect the bilateral commissions. There is no doubt the current Hungarian government give their 
commission a high priority. In 2013 Orbán  moved his deputy (Szijjártó) to what he saw as the key 
post of Chairman of the H-RICEC and as already noted that emphasis on trade relations with Russia is 
a key part of Hungary’s Eastern Winds Doctrine’.  In May 2013 Szijjártó’s spokeswoman said that 
“economic cooperation with the former Soviet member states are the foundation pillars of that  
government’ strategy of the Eastern Opening” (Hungarian Spectrum, 2013).  Szijjártó had also just 
been appointed Chairman of the Hungarian-Belarussian, Hungarian-Turkmen and Hungarian-Uzbek 
bilateral economic commissions.   
 
 
INSTEAD OF A CONCLUSION: TRADE AND ECONOMIC RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA 
DURING THE UKRAINE CRISIS 
 
Clearly it is rather early to analyse with any precision the impact of the Ukraine crisis either on the 
EU’s overall trade with Russia or the experience of individual EU member states. Yet a substantial 
decline in EU exports to Russia looks rather inevitable. As far as the trade and economic relations of 
the three with Russia are concerned, some broad observations are as follows. 
First, some levelling off and even slight decline of exports to Russia became evident in 2013. Czech 
exports for the year declined by 6% compared to 2012, Hungary’s by 1% and 7% for Slovakia. Data 
for 2014 shows that this trend has continued. Slovakia’s car exports to Russia fell by 21%between 
January and November 2014, for example. 
 Second, EU sanctions, and the responses by Russia, are not per se are not the major influence on the 
three’s exports to Russia at the current time. The sanctions so far have not focused on the key exports 
                                                          
11 That is by SMER in Slovakia, ČSSD in the Czech Republic and MSZP in Hungary all of which represent 
traditional the Russia-friendly wing of the political spectrum in each country. Following its return to office in 
2010, the current SMER government in Slovakia, for example, made the S-RICCEST a high priority. It has been 
investing quite heavily in increasing its role and effectiveness, and in 2012 shifted responsibility for the S-
RICCEST from the Ministry for Economy to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. In 2010 former (ČSSD) Prime 
Minister Jiri Paroubek was critical of the ODS governments efforts on bilateral economic cooperation with 
Russia when he said that “under a left-leaning government, officials “would be looking for ways to improve 
relations, namely of a business nature, with large neighbours to the east, especially Russia”’ (Dangerfield, 2013, 
181). 
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sectors of the three, though Russia’s action on agricultural imports from the EU do have implications  
for Hungary (though maybe ameliorated by bilateral arrangements?). Like several EU states, the three 
lobbied hard to avoid sanctions that would hurt their economic interests with Russia and seem to have 
been broadly successful. An important exemption on nuclear fuels imports from Russia was secured, 
despite pressure from some EU member states (and Westinghouse lobbying) to include it. 
Third, it does seem inevitable that the exports from the three and EU as a whole are likely to be a 
whole lot more  disrupted as the effects of the following come on stream: the effects of the sanctions 
on the Russian economy, the financial position of the Russian state, and import demand; the 
plummeting oil price (which has more than halved in the second half of 2014 )and the resultant effect 
on state revenues and level of imports; the drastic collapse of the rouble, which lost around half of its 
value against the $US during the last six months of 2014. This may even cause the value of exports to 
Russia to hold up and maybe even increase in the short term but a serious decline in Russian imports 
is inevitable. The pressure on state finances cast doubts about whether deals such the Russian loan for 
the development of Hungary’s PAKS nuclear power plant will actually go ahead.  
The next point is on the impact of the Ukrainian crisis on bilateral economic cooperation with Russia. 
Even though the plenary meetings of the bilateral Intergovernmental Commissions were not held 
during 2014 (some doubt in the case of Hungary), much of the regular work carried on in a low 
profile way with bilateral meetings of the Chairmen taking place and continuation of the activities of 
the working groups. For example Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Péter Szijjártó 
made working visit to Moscow on 19 November at the invitation of Russian Foreign Minister Sergey 
Lavrov. Earlier in the year, on 19 May, Slovak foreign Minister Mirolslav Lajčák met the Russian 
Foreign Minister in Moscow and “after meeting Lavrov, Lajčák also unofficially met with Russian 
Vice-premier Dmitry Rogozin, who co-chairs the Slovak-Russian Intergovernmental Commission for 
Economic and Scientific Cooperation. Both agreed to postpone the meeting of the commission, which 
was previously scheduled to take place in Slovakia next month” Slovak Spectator (2014). Finally, in 
January 2015 the Czech Ministry for Industry and Trade declared that it wanted “a meeting of the 
Czech Russian Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Industrial and Scientific Cooperation to 
take place in March” (Prague Post, 2015)  
The final point concerns the responses of the Hungarian and Slovak government and pro-Russia 
interventions of certain politicians in the Czech Republic (e.g. President Zeman). These are certainly 
not in themselves evidence of emergence of some new pro-Russia leanings and this is not a sudden 
surge in loyalty/closeness to Russia. Rather, as discussed in the previous section, they represent the 
expression of a longstanding feature of central European politics. Internal divisions on Russia have 
been present and evident ever since the end of communism. Whatever the merits of the narrative of a 
lurch to the ‘Russian’ model of democracy and even charges of ‘Putinisation’ in Hungary, this is a 
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somewhat separate phenomenon to the pragmatism driven by importance of economic links with 
Russia. It should be mentioned that the government of Orban’s predecessor, under Ferenc Gyurcsány, 
was if anything even closer to Russia and Putin. Moreover in the Czech Republic, where there is 
certainly no ‘Putinisation’ process, there is however an equally stubborn refusal to disengage from 
close economic relations with Russia. As noted above, the intention is  to hold a C-RICEISC meeting 
in March 2015 and on  2 October 2014 Trade and Industry Minister Jan Mládek met with Russian 
business representatives and diplomats at an international engineering fair in Brno. He said:  "this year 
we are facing a very difficult international political situation, which unfortunately has significant 
economic implications. notwithstanding this fact, the Russian market remains for Czech entrepreneurs 
interesting and important. Nowadays, the ministry of Industry and Trade and other ministries develop 
measures to minimize the impact of the current crisis. The Czech Republic does not leave the Russian 
market in any case and is ready to heavily defend its present hard—earned position” Czech Ministry 
of Industry and Trade, (2014). 
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Appendix 1: Statistical Tables 
 
 
Table 1: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia 1992-2003 (US$ millions) 
 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Czech 
Exports 
N/A 593 548 630 694 767 650 379 385 490 517 584 
Czech 
Imports 
N/A 1280 1264 1876 2004 1851 1579 1388 2074 2001 1844 2339 
Czech 
balance 
 
N/A (687) (715) (1246) (1310) (1084) (929) (1009) (1689) (1511) (1327) (1755) 
Hung. 
Exports 
1133 945 807 822 776 968 661 356 455 472 455 653 
Hung. 
Imports 
1674 2399 1746 1840 2021 1963 1666 1631 2589 2369 2284 2859 
Hung. 
balance 
 
(540.6
) 
(1454) (939) (1018) (1245) (995) (1005) (1275) (2134) (1897) (1829) (2206) 
Slovak 
Exports 
N/A 256 
 
278 331 
 
308 
 
333 
 
203 
 
103 
 
106 
 
130 
 
143 
 
267 
 
Slovak 
Imports 
N/A 1236 
 
1199 
 
1456 
 
1934 
 
1619 
 
1357 
 
1347 
 
2156 
 
2171 
 
2083 
 
2408 
 
Slovak 
balance 
N/A (980) (921) (1125) (1626) (1286) (1154) (1244) (2050) (2041) (1940) (2141) 
Sources: National Statistical Office of Hungary; National Statistical Office of Slovakia; National 
Statistical Office of the Czech Republic 
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Table 2: Reorientation of CEE-6 trade: exports, 1989-95 (%) 
CEE-6 exports to: 
 
1989 1995 
Former CMEA 47 23 
EU-15 35 63 
USA 2 2 
Japan 1 1 
Rest of the world 15 11 
Source: Reproduced from Grabbe and Hughes (1998, 13) 
 
Table 3: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia 2004-2012 (Euro millions) 
  
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
 
2013 
Index 
2013/ 
2004 
 
Czech 
Export 
770 1132 1504 2081 2911 1877 2672 3759  4760 4474 581 
Czech 
Import 
2184 3392 4224 3930 5987 3721 4885 5235 5820 5848 268 
Czech 
Balance 
(1414) (2260) (2720) (1849) (3076) (1844) (2213) (1476) (1024) (1374) 97 
Hungary 
Exports 
738 943 1617 2229 2666 2124 2583 2586 2567 2538 344 
Hungary 
Imports 
2875 3962 5118 4793 6651 4091 5196 6379 6447 6421 223 
Hungary 
Balance 
(2137) (3019) (3501) (2564) (3985) (1967) (2613) (3793) (3880) (3883) 181 
Slovakia 
Exports 
271 398 549 959 1811 1416 1933 2090 2638 2457 906 
Slovakia 
Imports 
2207 2980 4029 4017 5258 3473 4679 6212 5884 6139 278 
Slovakia 
Balance 
(1936) (2582) (3480) (3058) (3447) (2057) (2746) (4122) (3245) (3682) 190 
 
Source: Eurostat 
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Table 4: Czech, Hungarian and Slovak Trade with Russia 2004-2012 as % of total Extra-EU Trade 
 
 
Exports 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Czech 
Republic  
10.8 12.5 13.9 15.8 19.4 15.2 16.7 18.4 20.4 
Hungary 9.8 9.8 13.0 15.2 16.6 16.8 15.6 13.4 13.1 
Slovakia 9.1 12.1 12.5 17.0 25.6 24.9 25.4 23.9 25.6 
EU27 4.8 5.4 6.2 7.2 7.9 6.0 6.3 6.9 7.3 
 
Imports 
 
2004 
 
2005 
 
2006 
 
2007 
 
2008 
 
2009 
 
2010 
 
2011 
 
2012 
Czech 
Republic 
19.7 29.7 29.2 22.9 26.8 22.5 20.4 14.8 15.8 
Hungary  18.8 24.7 27.6 22.5 28.2 23.4 24.2 28.3 29.1 
Slovakia  43.5 48.2 45.2 35.8 38.9 34.6 34.0 40.4 37.1 
EU27 8.2 9.5 10.3 10.0 11.3 9.6 10.5 11.6 11.9 
 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Table 5: Energy Security – Dependence On Russian Natural Gas (Imports from Russia as % total 
gas imports in 2012)  
 
 
Czech Republic 69% 
Hungary 83% 
Slovakia 94.5% 
 Source: Dangerfield (2013a) 
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Table 6: Nuclear Electricity Generation in the  Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia   
 
 No. of Soviet-built  
reactors 
Nuclear power as % of 
domestic electricity 
generation 
 
Czech Republic 6 33% 
Hungary 4 33% 
Slovakia 4 55% 
Source: Dangerfield (2013a) 
 
